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process, there will be but a small number, occupying the first rank
of privilege among the material-men. It appears however, from
the analysis of the elaims submitted by the .Commissioner, that
there are some of this description. These will be ascertained by
reference to the report; and full payment will be decreed to them,
so far as they have'admiralty liens. The claim of George F.
Morton, of Erie, Pennsylvania,-the boats being foreign as to him
-will be included in the class of privileged claims to be first paid.
The claims for seamen's wages, and the preferred class of material-men being proyided for in the decree, those who have acquired
liens by seizure under the law of Ohio, will constitute the next
class. These -will be paid pro rata, from the funds remaining,
without reference to the order of time, in which the seizures were
made.
It is proper to notice, that the claim of James M. Sexton, the
original libellant in the case of the Troy, embraces an account for
wages, as master of the boat, and also as mate. Ithis clear, that;
upon no principle has the master a lien on the vessel for his wages.
This part of the claim i therefore rejected; and the decree will
embrace only the amount due him for wages, as mate.
These are the only material points presented on the exceptions to
the report of the Commissioner. A. decree in each of the cases
will be entered in accordance with the principles before stated.
The libels filed by interveners, having neither an admiralty lien,
or a lien by seizure under the Ohio Statute, are dismissed at the
costs of the libellants.
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In our last, we had occasion to observe, that the more close and
accurate our investigations, the fewer exceptions we find to the
various principles of the law. It may be added, that the fewer in
number we perceive the elementary legal principles to be.
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All things are resolvable into a few original elements; truth is so,
and legal truth is no exception to the rule. For example, the
various maxims of the law, which have come down to us from our
forefathers, in their ancient dress of Latin and barbarous French, are
often looked upon as original legal principles. So, indeed, many of
them are; but many, also, are mere offshoots from otheils, being
only secondary, or consequential, steps of reasoning, or fragmentary expressions of what in other maxims is expressed in more
broad and comprehensive terms. Thus the maxim, famous in
insurance law, and much regarded in some other departments of
jurisprudence, Non remota causa sed proxima spectatur, is only a
particular statement of a larger truth more accurately expressed in
the comprehensive words, De minimis non curat lex. Now this
latter maxim', that the law does not concern itself about small things,
is universal; not, indeed, to be applied to every question, but to
every case and circumstance which, in its own nature and in the
nature of jurisprudence, it will fit. And a close examination of the
matter will doubtless show, that the reason why the law does not
regard the remote, but only the proximate cause, as expressed in the
former maxim, is that the remote cause is too small a thing for it
to notice. When, however, the remote cause is not too small, the
law does regard it; and hence we read of exceptions to this maxim.
But if we sink this maxim, and adhere only to the other more comprehensive and more accurate one, we gain two objects-first, we
reduce the number of our legal principles; and secondly, we get rid
of encumbering our minds most unsatisfactorily with exceptions.
We have brought forward this illustration merely to enforce the
general idea, that we should always resolve back propositions in the
law as far as possible to their original elements, which elements
only are to be regarded properly as legal principles.
There is the same difference between a mere legal truth and a legal
principle, as between the trunk and twig of a tree. And one of the
most important arts of our profession is to distinguish twigs from
trunks. Legal trees are to be ascended. We are to find, and know,
and remember where are located, the trunks; from which we may go
up at pleasure to the twigs.
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But discarding all figure of speech, when we have presented to
us what we know to be a legal truth, our care should be to ascertain
whether it be an elementary truth. Can it be traced to a doctrine,
more general and universal, of which it is a secondary form? If
so, what is that doctrine, and what other secondary forms have
arisen from it?
Now, suppose we have thus found what appears to be a general
first principle. We trace out that principle to its various consequences. Are4hose consequences such as the adjudications of the
courts show us to have an actual existence in the law? If we see,
on the comparison, that our supposed principle, traced in every
direction, leads to consequences precisely in accordance with the
facts of the law as exemplified in the decisions of the Courts, we
conclude that it is true and sound; in other words, that it is a legal
principle. In so comparing our deductions with the decisions, we do
not inquire, as being material, whether or not the judges, in arriving
at the decisions, have recognized our principle. If they have, we
may still find that it is erroneous; if they have not, we may yet
find that it is correct.
But suppose we discover a single case or two not in accordance
with the, deductions from our principle. Such a case will cast suspicion on the principle; yet still the case may be wrong. It would
be impossible to lay down any exact rule as to how many adjudications would suffice to show a supposed principle erroneous. Tv'f
things might, however, happen together-that the principle wouli
be right; and, at the same time, that a series of adjudicatioii which
oaild not be overthrown, would be found to conflict with some
inevitable deduction from it. Here we should be obliged t6 dmit,
that there was an exception to the principle a matter which we
discussed in our last number.
These hints will serve, in some degree, to satisfy the inquiry, how
legal principles are to be learned. But it may be objected, that
such a process of learning them, so laborious and slow, could only
be gone though in one's lifetime. This is undoubtedly more than
true. No man's life would be long enough for a thorough acquisition
of them all; just as no individual could master, as a first discoverer,

